Analyzing Websites for User-Visible Security Design Flaws

Laura Falk, Atul Prakash, Kevin Borders
University of Michigan

Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security July 23-25, 2008

Motivation: Authors' Personal Experiences

- On-line banking
 - Login boxes on insecure pages
- Need to reach customer service
 - Contact information on an insecure page
- Setting up retirement account on-line
 - User id was SSN
- Decided to analyze other banks to see if the problems were more common and if we could help nudge banks in the right direction

Goals

- We mostly focus on security problems that should be visible to careful users of a web site
 - Most make it hard for even careful users to make correct judgement calls
- We picked on financial sites because they are assumed to be designed by security experts and their users are frequently targeted

Our Study


- We chose not to examine "bugs" or browser flaws
 - E.g., buffer overflows, cross-site scripting, etc.
 - The flaws we discuss affect users who are using bug-free client software
- Could not analyze all flaws (e.g., those that require login at the bank sites)

Methodology

- A combination of automated and manual analysis of 214 websites (mostly banks)
- Source of list:
 - http://www.quazell.com/bank/bank-usa.html
- Study initiated in Fall of 2006
 - Used 5 visible flaws found in initial analysis of 20 sites
 - Downloaded website contents to disk
 - Searched files containing web pages using scripts


Login Window on an Insecure Page

- Presenting secure login options on insecure page
 - Attacker could modify insecure page
 - Forward login credentials to another destination




Short Video Illustrating an Attack on Insecure Login Pages (Recorded on July 20th, 2008)

Example Risk Scenario



Contact Information on an Insecure Page



Video illustrating the compromise of "Contact Us" Pages (Recorded on July 20th, 2008)


Should this be a concern?

- Exploits would not be straightforward (e.g., may require setting up a rogue call center), but attackers are becoming more organized
 - Other customer service channels, such as chat, may also be created that could be exploited cheaply
- Bottom Line: No good reason why banks should not securely deliver all content

Use of Third-Party Sites

- Break in the chain of trust
 - Forward user to new pages that have different domains
 - Often no notification of any 3rd party transition
 - Potential for customer confusion
 - User has no straightforward way of knowing if 3rd party domain is trustworthy

Example






en 7 Days_{ss}



TCF Totally Free Checking



Great Home Equity Rates






Online Banking >

Online Brokerage >

Example (contd.)

Transition to 3rd party site (2006 example)



Short Video demonstrating User Confusion with Third-Party Domains (Recorded on July 24th, 2008)

Informal Poll

- Visit your bank(s) web page
 - Locate login window
 - Is it on an insecure or secure page?
 - Locate the contact information
 - Is it on an insecure or secure page?
 - Is your bank using 3rd party sites?
- We will ask for a show of hands for these questions at the end of the talk

Policies on User Ids and Passwords

- Inadequate or unclear policies for user ids and passwords
 - Some sites used social security numbers for login (e.g., TIAA-CREF in 2006. We contacted them about it. Since changed the policy)
 - May not require or recommend strong passwords

Ambiguity in Policies

- E-mailing security sensitive information insecurely
 - Sites offered to send statements and passwords through e-mail
 - As we know and banks know, email is not a secure medium
- (Caveat: It is possible that the sites will only send you a notification, not the the actual statement. But this was often not apparent from the wording.)

Example

Offering to e-mail security sensitive information

EDUCATION & SUPPORT

Learning Center | Forms | Tools | News | Publications | FAQs

Account Features E-Delivery

Using Quicken

E-DELIVERY

- Can I have printed statements as well as an electronic copy sent to me?
- How do I sign up for electronic delivery?
- How do I update my email address?
- When logged in to Secure Access, I receive a message stating that I have "no mail." How do I get mail?
- How do I change the electronic delivery preference back to postal mail?
- When I attempt to view my quarterly report, I get an error stating that my password does not match. Why can't I view my statements online?

Can I have printed statements as well as an electronic copy sent to me?

You can elect e-delivery of your statements via the email tab in Secure Access. In addition, when your statement is available there is also an option within Documents to receive a hard copy by selecting the "send by mail" tab. This will generate a hardcopy of your report.



Search

GLOSSARY

Look up a word or phrase»

In Control of Your Account, Anytime

Take a guided tour of online access

Need Help?

- View Site Map
- Meetings & Counseling

back to top

Results

 List of Design Flaws and Percentage of Sites Affected

Specific Design Flaw	% of Sites Affected
Login window on insecure page	47%
Contact info on insecure page	55%
Inadequate policies on user ids/ passwords	28%
E-mailing sensitive information	31%
Use of 3 rd party sites	30%

Key Points

- Several of these design flaws were widespread
- 76% had at at least one design flaw (note: use of non-SSL pages more critical than others)
- Almost half the sites presented login boxes on insecure pages
- Use of 3rd party domains was fairly common
- Less than half secured their contact information
- Scope for improvement in other areas, such as better policies on userids, passwords, and email use by the site

Some Limitations of Our Study

- We may have failed to completely retrieve all relevant pages
 - Impact: our results likely to under-estimate flaws
- Only looked financial institutions in U.S.
 - Results could be different in other countries.
- We used heuristics for automated analysis
 - Could cause us to under or over estimate errors
- Human errors where we did manual inspection

Some Related Work

- Users may make errors even if banks fix the design flaws [Schechter et al.]
- Implementation flaws are also common
 - Application level website scanners
- Rogerio de Paula et al., discovered that implementation and integration of technical components is hard with respect to security
 - Perhaps, bank sites have multiple domains and administrators. No one looking at the "big picture"

Usability Lessons for Web Sites

- Provide a consistent experience to users so that it is easier for users to spot deviations from the norm
 - Stay on the same hostname (www.bank.com)
 - Next best: www.bank.com to secure.bank.com
 - Next best: make "proper introduction"
 - From the original domain over HTTPS
 - Say whether the new domain can be trusted
 - Use SSL throughout the site.

The Big Picture – Take Away

- We want to help banks by this study recognize the importance of usable security – problems are common
- Key recommendations:
 - Use SSL for entire site (no exceptions)
 - Discontinue use of 3rd party domains if possible (especially for services for the same bank) or introduce them securely
 - Improve security policies and state them clearly
- Benefits: Hopefully, that will make it easier for careful customers to notice inconsistencies because most financial sites will use a simple, consistent model

Informal Poll

- Did your bank's login window reside on an insecure page?
- Did the contact information on your bank's site reside on an insecure page?
- Did your bank use 3rd party domains during authentication?

Questions?