

Lecture 14: IPSec, Firewall

Security at the Network Layer

There are security concerns that **apply to multiple applications** and cut across protocol layers

Shouldn't security be implemented by the network layer **for all applications**?

Benefits of network-layer security:

- below transport layer: **transparent to applications**
- can be **transparent to end users**
- helps **secure routing architecture**

At Which Layer to Put Security?

Link-oriented vs. end-to-end

Which layer?

- application layer: secure email (PGP), SSH, DNSSec
- above TCP: Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Netscape, 1994, used by HTTPS
- IPSec: Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

IPSec: Network Layer Security

Provides:

- network-layer **authentication**: destination host can authenticate source IP address
- network-layer **confidentiality and integrity**:
 - sending host encrypts the data in IP datagram

Two principle protocols:

- **authentication header** (AH) protocol
- **encapsulation security payload** (ESP) protocol
- **mandatory** in IPv6, optional in IPv4

IPSec: Network Layer Security


To use either AH or ESP, source and destination hosts perform connection handshake:

- to create a network-layer end-to-end logical channel called a **security association (SA)**
- SA sets up a **shared secret** between the two hosts
- each SA is **unidirectional**, uniquely determined by:
 - security protocol (AH or ESP)
 - source IP address
 - 32-bit connection ID

Authentication Header (AH) Protocol

Provides source **authentication** and **data integrity**, but no confidentiality/secretcy

AH header (IP protocol# 51) inserted between IP header and payload



Intermediate routers process datagrams as usual


AH header includes:

- **connection identifier**
- **authentication data**: **source-signed message digest** calculated over original IP datagram (payload and most header fields)
- **next header field**: specifies type of data (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP)

ESP Protocol

Provides source authentication, data integrity, **and confidentiality/secretcy**

ESP header (IP protocol# 50) inserted between IP header and payload, followed by ESP trailer and ESP authentication



- payload and ESP trailer are encrypted
- next header field is in ESP trailer
- optional authentication is similar to AH's

ESP is used to provide VPNs

What is a VPN?

Makes a shared network look like a private network


Why VPN?

- VPN makes **separated IP sites look like one private IP network**
- **private addresses and domain names** (useful for authorization)
- security
- bandwidth guarantees, quality of service (QoS), service-level agreement (SLA) across ISP
- simplified network operation: ISP can do the routing for you
- building a real private network is expensive (cheaper to use shared resources rather than to have dedicated resources)

End-to-end VPNs

Solves the problem of connecting remote hosts to a firewalled network


- commonly used for roaming
- benefits in the form of security and private addresses only
- no simplicity or QoS benefit



Network VPNs


Customer based:

- customer buys own equipment, configures IPsec tunnels across the global Internet, manages addressing and routing
- ISP plays no role
- customer has more control over security and ISP choices, but requires skills



Provider based:

- provider manages all the complexity of the VPN, usually with MPLS (see lecture on MPLS)
- customer simply connects to the provider equipment



Denial of Service (DoS) Attack


An **attacker inundates its victim with otherwise legitimate service requests or traffic** such that victim's resources are overloaded and overwhelmed to the point that the victim can perform no useful work and legitimate users are denied service

Examples:

- SYN flood: send lots of TCP SYN to fill up victim's listen queue
- smurf attack: broadcast ICMP echo requests with the source address spoofed to victim's
- IP fragmentation
- TCP reassembly

Distributed DoS (DDoS) Attack

Attacker commandeers systems (**zombies**) **distributed** across the Internet, forming a botnet, to send correlated service requests or traffic to the victim to overload the victim




Firewalls

One way to protect against hosts being taken over and made zombies

A firewall: a **barrier** that restricts the free flow of data between the “inside” and the “outside”

A **border checkpoint** to monitor traffic for known attack patterns (**intrusion detection**)



Advantages of Firewalls

Firewall vs. security hardening of each host:

- **more convenient**: border checkpoint
- **more secure**: a firewall is not a general purpose machine
 - administrator of firewall is more security conscious (hopefully)
 - firewall has restricted access, usually can be made less convenient to use (e.g., requiring one-time passcode)
- **central point of control** for mail, ftp, web administration
- can also be used internally (between departments)

Firewalls

Goals:

- to **prevent illegal modification or access** of internal data
- to **allow only authorized access** to internal network (set of authenticated users/hosts)
- to **prevent host intrusion** for launching a DDoS attack
- in general, to isolate an organization’s internal network from the larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass through, blocking others


Design criteria:

- **all traffic** must go through the firewall
- only **authorized traffic** will be allowed to pass
- authorization must be a **local security policy**
- the firewall itself must be **immune to penetration**

Types of Firewall

Three types of firewall:

1. packet filter
2. circuit-level gateway
3. application-level gateway



Packet-filter:

- drop packet not matching any given header patterns
- filter usually constructed out of source address, destination address, source port, destination port, TCP flag fields, ICMP message type, deep packet inspection (DPI) of packet contents
- allow for wild-card values

Packet Filtering Examples

Block all packets with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or destination port = 23

- all incoming and outgoing UDP flows are blocked
- all Telnet connections are blocked

Block inbound TCP packets with SYN flag set but ACK flag not set

- blocks external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients
- but allows completion of internally initiated TCP connections

Block all packets with TCP port of Quake

[after Rexford]

Packet Filter Configuration

Firewall applies a set of rules to each packet

- to decide whether to allow or block the packet

Each rule is a test on the packet

- comparing IP and TCP/UDP header fields to determine whether to allow or block

Order matters

- once a packet matches a rule, the decision is made

[after Rexford]

Packet Filter Configuration Example

Alice runs a network with address prefix 222.22.0.0/16

- she wants to allow Bob's school to access hosts on her subnet 222.22.22.0/24
 - Bob is on address prefix 111.11.0.0/16
- Alice doesn't trust Trudy, who is inside Bob's network
 - Trudy is on address prefix 111.11.11.0/24
- Alice **doesn't allow** any other traffic from the Internet

Rules


1. Don't let Trudy's machines in
 - `block(src = 111.11.11.0/24, dst = 222.22.0.0/16)`
2. Let the rest of Bob's network in to subnet 222.22.22.0/24
 - `allow(src=111.11.0.0/16, dst = 222.22.22.0/24)`
3. Block the rest of the world
 - `block(src = 0.0.0.0/0, dst = 0.0.0.0/0)`

[after Rexford]

Gateways

Circuit-level gateways: force every connection to go through the gateway

Circuit-level gateways usually do not look at the bytes sent, it serves mainly for logging of allowed connections



Example:

1. require all web users to http through gateway
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up http connection to remote host
3. gateway relays data between 2 connections
4. router's filter blocks all http connections not originating from gateway

Application-level gateways further parse traffic and allow only known operations

A Variation: Traffic Management

Allow vs. block is too binary a decision

- maybe better to classify the traffic based on rules and then handle the classes of traffic differently

Traffic shaping (rate limiting)

- limit the amount of bandwidth certain traffic may consume, e.g., rate limit Web or P2P traffic

Separate queues

- use rules to group related packets and then do round-robin scheduling across groups, e.g., separate queue for each internal IP address

[Rexford]

Firewall Implementation Challenges

Per-packet handling

- must inspect every packet
- challenging on very [high-speed links](#)

Complex filtering rules

- may have [large number](#) of rules
- may have very [complicated](#) rules
- filter specification language could make certain [policies hard to express](#)
- filters interaction could give rise to [unintended policies](#) (bugs in filter specifications)
- filter specification for protocols [without fixed port](#) number difficult
- not very effective against connectionless UDP (filters often use [all or nothing policy for UDP](#))

[after Rexford]

Firewall Deployment Challenges

Location of firewalls

- complex firewalls near the edge, at low speed
- simpler firewalls in the core, at higher speed

Other limitations:

- [IP spoofing](#): firewall can't know if data "really" comes from claimed source
- if multiple apps need special treatment, each needs its own app gateway
- client software must know how to contact gateway, e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser

Tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world vs. level of security

Clever Users Subvert Firewalls

Many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks


Packet-filter and circuit-level gateways can be (ab)used for tunneling under the firewall

- The Great Firewall of China prevents access to certain IP addresses and port numbers
 - users may log into another machine and then onward to the blocked servers
 - can be automated by the use of VPN or TOR
- firewall allows only port 80 (e.g., Web) traffic
 - p2p client uses port 80

Middleboxes

Firewalls, NAT boxes, traffic shapers, web caches, tunnel (VPN) endpoints are examples of so-called “middleboxes”

- intermediaries interposed in-between communicating hosts
- often without the knowledge of one or both parties



Advantages of Middleboxes

Improve performance between edge networks


- e.g., multiple sites of the same company or between residential access network and data centers
- through buffering, compression, encryption, caching, etc.

Incrementally deployable

- no changes needed at the end hosts or the rest of the Internet
- inspects packets as they go by and takes necessary action transparent to the user

[after Rexford]

Example: WAN Accelerators



- Appliance with a lot of local memory
- Sends ACK packets quickly to the sender
- Overwrites receive window with a large value
- Or, even run a new and improved version of TCP

[after Rexford]

Two Views of Middleboxes

A practical necessity that

- solves real and pressing problems
- meets needs that are not likely to go away

An **abomination**

- a violation of layering
- causes confusion in reasoning about the network
- is responsible for many subtle bugs

[after Rexford]

Network Security (Summary)

Basic techniques

- cryptography (symmetric and public)
- authentication, message integrity, digital signature
- key distribution

used in many different security scenarios

- secure email (PGP), secure connection (SSH)
- secure transport (SSL)
- IPsec
- 802.11 (WPA)

Network Security (Summary)

Network security is an ongoing arms race

- breaking things is fun to some
- *ad hoc* approaches

And then there's unwanted traffic, spam, phishing, and user tracking and privacy violation, etc.