

Having a BLAST with SLAM

Building Up To: Software Model Checking via Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement

- There are easily two dozen SLAM/BLAST/MAGIC papers; I will skim.

Where's the Beef

- To produce the explicit counter-example, use the "onion-ring method"
  - A counter-example is a valid execution path
  - For each Image Ring (= set of states), find a state and link it with the concrete transition relation R
  - Since each Ring is "reached in one step from previous ring" (e.g., Ring#3 = EX(Ring#4)) this works
  - Each state z comes with L(z) so you know what is true at each point (= what the values of variables are)



This is a labeled transition system, not a program!

Key Terms

- CEGAR = Counterexample guided abstraction refinement. A successful software model-checking approach. Sometimes called "Iterative Abstraction Refinement".
- SLAM = The first CEGAR project/tool. Developed at MSR.
- Lazy Abstraction = A CEGAR optimization used in the BLAST tool from Berkeley.
- Other terms: c2bp, bebop, newton, npackets++, MAGIC, flying boxes, etc.

So … what *is* Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement?

- Theorem Proving?
- Dataflow Analysis?
- Model Checking?

Verification by Theorem Proving

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:        q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```

1. Loop Invariants
2. Logical formula
3. Check Validity

Invariant:

$$lock \wedge new = old$$

$$\vee$$

$$\neg\, lock \wedge new \neq old$$

Verification by Theorem Proving

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:        q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```

1. Loop Invariants
2. Logical formula
3. Check Validity

- Loop Invariants
- Multithreaded Programs
+ Behaviors encoded in logic
+ Decision Procedures

Precise [ESC, PCC]

Verification by Program Analysis

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:        q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```

1. Dataflow Facts
2. Constraint System
3. Solve constraints

- Imprecision due to fixed facts

+ Abstraction

+ Type/Flow Analyses

Scalable [CQUAL, ESP, MC]

Verification by Model Checking

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:        q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```

1. (Finite State) Program
2. State Transition Graph
3. Reachability

- Pgm → Finite state model
- State explosion

+ State Exploration

+ Counterexamples

Precise [SPIN, SMV, Bandera, JPF]

One Ring To Rule Them All?

Combining Strengths



Theorem Proving

- Need loop invariants
(will find automatically)
+ Behaviors encoded in logic
(used to refine abstraction)
+ Theorem provers
(used to compute successors, refine abstraction)

Program Analysis

- Imprecise
(will be precise)
+ Abstraction
(will shrink the state space we must explore)

Model Checking

- Finite-state model, state explosion
(will find small good model)
+ State Space Exploration
(used to get a path sensitive analysis)
+ Counterexamples
(used to find relevant facts, refine abstraction)

Topic:
Software Model Checking via Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement

- There are easily two dozen SLAM/BLAST/MAGIC papers; I will skim.

SLAM Overview

- INPUT: Program *and* Specification
  - Standard C Program (pointers, procedures)
  - Specification = Partial Correctness
    - Given as a finite state machine (typestate)
    - "I use locks correctly" not "I am a webserver"
- OUTPUT: Verified *or* Counterexample
  - Verified = program does not violate spec
    - Can come with proof!
  - Counterexample = concrete bug instance
    - A path through the program that violates the spec

Take-Home Message

- SLAM is a software model checker. It abstracts C programs to boolean programs and model-checks the boolean programs.
- No errors in the boolean program implies no errors in the original.
- An error in the boolean program may be a real bug. Or SLAM may refine the abstraction and start again.

Property 1: Double Locking



*"An attempt to re-acquire an acquired lock or release a released lock will cause a **deadlock**."*

Calls to **lock** and **unlock** must **alternate**.

Property 2: Drop Root Privilege



[Chen-Dean-Wagner '02]

"User applications must not run with root privilege"

When **execv** is called, must have **suid ≠ 0**

Property 3 : IRP Handler



[Fahndrich]

Example SLAM Input

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:        q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```



SLAM in a Nutshell

```
SLAM(Program p, Spec s) =                          // program name
 Program q = incorporate_spec(p,s);                  // slic
 PredicateSet abs = { };
 while true do
   BooleanProgram b = abstract(q,abs);               // c2bp
   match model_check(b) with                         // bebop
   | No_Error → printf("no bug"); exit(0)
   | Counterexample(c) →
       if is_valid_path(c, p) then                   // newton
         printf("real bug"); exit(1)
       else
         abs ← abs ∪ new_preds(c)                    // newton
 done
```

Incorporating Specs

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:       q->data = new;
         unlock();
         new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return;
}
```




```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
       if L=1 goto ERR;
       else L=1;
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:         q->data = new;
           if L=0 goto ERR;
           else L=0;
           new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  if L=0 goto ERR;
    else L=0;
    return;
ERR: abort();
}
```

Original program violates spec iff new program reaches ERR

Program As Labeled Transition System



State — **Transition**

pc	3		*pc* 4
lock	●		lock ○
old	5		old 5
new	5		new 6
q	0x133a		q 0x133a

```
3: unlock();
   new++;
4: } …
```

```
Example ( ) {
1: do {
       lock();
       old = new;
       q = q->next;
2:     if (q != NULL){
3:         q->data = new;
           unlock();
           new ++;
       }
4: } while(new != old);
5:  unlock ();
    return; }
```

The Safety Verification Problem



Error

(e.g., states with PC = Err)

Safe States

(never reach Error)

Initial

Is there a **path** from an **initial** to an **error** state ?

Problem: **Infinite** state graph (old=1, old=2, old=…)

Solution : **Set** of states ≃ logical **formula**

Representing [Sets of States] as *Formulas*

$[F]$ states satisfying F $\{s \mid s \models F\}$	F FO fmla over prog. vars
$[F_1] \cap [F_2]$	$F_1 \wedge F_2$
$[F_1] \cup [F_2]$	$F_1 \vee F_2$
$\overline{[F]}$	$\neg F$
$[F_1] \subseteq [F_2]$	$F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$

i.e. $F_1 \wedge \neg F_2$ unsatisfiable

Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction



- **Predicates** on program state:
  lock *(i.e., lock=true)*
  old = new

- States satisfying **same** predicates are **equivalent**
  - **Merged** into one **abstract state**

- #abstract states is **finite**
  - **Thus model-checking the abstraction will be feasible!**

Abstract States and Transitions





Abstraction





Existential Lifting

(i.e., $A_1 \rightarrow A_2$ iff $\exists c_1 \in A_1.\ \exists c_2 \in A_2.\ c_1 \rightarrow c_2$)

Abstraction



State



Analyze Abstraction



Analyze finite graph

Over Approximate:

Safe ⇒ System Safe

No **false negatives**

Problem

Spurious **counterexamples**

Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement



Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction!

Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement



Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. **Add predicates** to distinguish states across **cut**
2. Build **refined** abstraction

Imprecision due to **merge**

Iterative Abstraction-Refinement



[Kurshan et al 93] [Clarke et al 00]
[Ball-Rajamani 01]

Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

1. Add predicates to distinguish states across **cut**
2. Build **refined** abstraction
   -eliminates counterexample
3. **Repeat** search
   Untill real counterexample or system proved safe

Problem: Abstraction is Expensive





Reachable

Problem

#abstract states = $2^{\#predicates}$

Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Observe

Fraction of state space reachable

#Preds ~ 100's, #States ~ 2^{100} ,

#Reach ~ 1000's

Solution1: Only Abstract Reachable States





Safe

Problem

#abstract states = $2^{\#predicates}$

Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Solution

Build abstraction **during** search

Solution2: Don't Refine Error-Free Regions



Problem

#abstract states = $2^{\#predicates}$

Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Solution

Don't refine error-free regions

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll Abstraction

1. Pick tree-node **(=abs. state)**
2. Add children **(=abs. successors)**
3. On **re-visiting** abs. state, **cut-off**

Find min infeasible suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll Abstraction

1. Pick tree-node **(=abs. state)**
2. Add children **(=abs. successors)**
3. On **re-visiting** abs. state, **cut-off**

Find min infeasible suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll

1. Pick tree-node **(=abs. state)**
2. Add children **(=abs. successors)**
3. On **re-visiting** abs. state, **cut-off**

Find min spurious suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

S1: Only Abstract Reachable States

S2: Don't refine error-free regions

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK*

Reachability Tree

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK*

Reachability Tree

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK*

Reachability Tree

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK*

Reachability Tree

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK*



Reachability Tree

Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK*



Reachability Tree

Analyze Counterexample

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK*



lock()
old = new
q=q->next

[q!=NULL]

q->data = new
unlock()
new++

[new==old]

unlock()

Reachability Tree

Analyze Counterexample

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK*



`old = new`

`new++`

`[new==old]`

Inconsistent

new == old

Reachability Tree

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Reachability Tree

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Reachability Tree

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Reachability Tree

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Reachability Tree

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Reachability Tree

Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Repeat Build-and-Search

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*



SAFE

Reachability Tree

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll

1. Pick tree-node **(=abs. state)**
2. Add children **(=abs. successors)**
3. On **re-visiting** abs. state, **cut-off**

Find min spurious suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

S1: Only Abstract Reachable States

S2: Don't refine error-free regions

Two handwaves

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2:    if (q != NULL){
3:      q->data = new;
        unlock();
        new ++;
      }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```


Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

SAFE

Reachability Tree

Two handwaves

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```

Q. How to compute "successors" ?



Predicates: LOCK, new==old

Reachability Tree

Two handwaves

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```





Q. How to compute “successors” ?

Q. How to find predicates ?

Refinement

Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

Two handwaves

Q. How to compute “successors” ?



Refinement

Predicates: LOCK, new==old

Weakest Preconditions

WP(P,OP)

Weakest formula *P'* s.t.

if *P'* is true before *OP*

then *P* is true after *OP*



Weakest Preconditions

WP(P,OP)

Weakest formula *P'* s.t.

if *P'* is true before *OP*

then *P* is true after *OP*







How to compute successor ?

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



For each *p*

- Check if ***p*** is true (or false) after ***OP***

Q: When is ***p*** true after ***OP*** ?

- If ***WP(p, OP)*** is true before ***OP*** !
- We know ***F*** is true before ***OP***
- Thm. Pvr. Query: $F \Rightarrow WP(p, OP)$

Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

How to compute successor ?

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}7
```



For each *p*

- Check if *p* is true (or false) after *OP*

Q: When is *p* false after *OP* ?

- If ***WP(¬ p, OP)*** is true before *OP* !
- We know *F* is true before *OP*
- Thm. Pvr. Query: $F \Rightarrow WP(\neg p, OP)$

Predicates: *LOCK, new==old*

How to compute successor ?

```
Example ( ) {
1: do{
     lock();
     old = new;
     q = q->next;
2:   if (q != NULL){
3:     q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
     }
4:}while(new != old);
5: unlock ();
}
```



For each *p*

- Check if ***p*** is true (or false) after ***OP***

Q: When is *p* false after *OP* ?

- If ***WP(¬ p, OP)*** is true before *OP* !
- We know *F* is true before *OP*
- Thm. Pvr. Query: $F \Rightarrow WP(\neg p, OP)$

Predicate: *new==old*

True ? $(LOCK , new==old) \Rightarrow (new + 1 = old)$ ***NO***

False ? $(LOCK , new==old) \Rightarrow (new + 1 \neq old)$ ***YES***

Advanced SLAM/BLAST

Too Many Predicates

- Use Predicates Locally

Counter-Examples

- Craig Interpolants

Procedures

- Summaries

Concurrency

- Thread-Context Reasoning

SLAM Summary

1) Instrument Program With Safety Policy
2) Predicates = { }
3) Abstract Program With Predicates
   - Use Weakest Preconditions and Theorem Prover Calls
4) Model-Check Resulting Boolean Program
   - Use Symbolic Model Checking
5) Error State Not Reachable?
   - Original Program Has No Errors: Done!
6) Check Counterexample Feasibility
   - Use Symbolic Execution
7) Counterexample Is Feasible?
   - Real Bug: Done!
8) Counterexample Is Not Feasible?
   1) Find New Predicates (Refine Abstraction)
   2) Goto Line 3

Optional: SLAM Weakness

```
1: F() {
2:   int x=0;
3:   lock();
4:   do x++;
5:   while (x ≠ 88);
6:   if (x < 77)
7:       lock();
8: }
```

- Preds = {}, Path = 234567
- [x=0, ¬x+1≠88, x+1<77]
- Preds = {x=0}, Path = 234567
- [x=0, ¬x+1≠88, x+1<77]
- Preds = {x=0, x+1=88}
- Path = 2345**45**67
- [x=0, ¬x+2≠88, x+2<77]
- Preds = {x=0,x+1=88,x+2=88}
- Path = 2345**45**4567
- …
- Result: the predicates "count" the loop iterations

Homework

- Read Winskel Chapter 2
- Read Hoare paper
- Read Optional papers