The readings will change often, so watch for updates on Piazza.
Essays and Reviews: Paper Response Guidelines
Students will write a series of critical responses to papers we assign for reading. See the slides from Lecture 1 for the process and expectations for essays and reviews.
Plagiarism will result in a zero on the assignment and a likely failing grade in the course. We follow the Writing with Sources, 3rd Edition guidebook when assessing an essay for plagiarism. Make sure you're aware of how we decide plagiarism based on this guidebook. Do not accidentally violate this policy. We welcome questions during office hours if you seek additional practical tips on how to avoid plagiarism.
Paper Reviews: Basic Tips
We recommend following the advice of Hill and McKinley on how to write constructive and positive reviews. Write a ~400 word critical response to papers assigned for review. What should your review contain?
- In the first paragraph:
- State the problem that the paper tries to solve; and
- Summarize the main contributions.
- In one or more additional paragraphs:
- Evaluate the paper's strengths and weaknesses;
- Discuss something you would have done differently if you had written the paper; and
- Suggest one or more interesting open problems on related topics.
Your most important task is to demonstrate that you've read the paper and thought carefully about the topic. It's easy to find flaws; it's more challenging to tease out the diamonds in the rough of what the authors meant but did not say. Do not share reviews with your peers; plagiarism will result in a zero and likely failure of the course. It's not worth it! Wait until after lecture to share your thoughts and writing with peers.
Paper responses are due before the start of lecture on paper for peer-review during class.
Critical Essays: Common mistakes and pitfalls to avoid
- Writing a summary instead of a critical essay
- Writing a narrative in the 1st person rather than a formal essay in the 3rd person where the research rather than the researcher is the subject
- Lack of paragraph coherence and structure
- Excessive quotation or plagiarism
- Lack of a title, lack of spell checking, poor grammar
- Excessive underlining or italics (please eschew!)
- Excessive passive voice indicating lack of a meaningful noun as the subject
Essay 1: End-to-End Argument and Spectre/Meltdown
(Due Thursday, 1/11
before lecture on printed paper for in-class peer review)
Use the end-to-end argument to explain how computer systems could better remain trustworthy despite security design flaws later found in lower-level components or layers (e.g., Spectre, Meltdown, TPMs). Hardware and software may contain undiscovered design flaws such that that mechanisms fail to adequately enforce guarantees of memory isolation. Consider what can the end-to-end argument teach us about making trustworthy software systems out of untrustworthy hardware components, what philosophical exceptions to the E2E argument may arise in the case of Spectre/Meltdown, and what are the limits of the E2E argument for securing computer systems.
Follow the instructions in Lecture 1 for your essay. Make sure to have a meaningful short title and begin your text with a technical thesis statement. Your name and the date should appear in the header. Every paragraph should have a clear topic sentence, and every sentence should support the topic sentence and thesis statement to warrant inclusion. For a one-page essay, a good rule of thumb is that your essay would use 2-3 pieces of evidence to support a technical argument.
Essay 2: Return from which mountain?
(Due Tuesday, 1/23
for in-class peer review)
Many solutions have been proposed to defend against Return Oriented Programming (ROP), a class of vulnerabilities pioneered by Hovav Shacham and others. Imagine that someone devises a technique that claims to completely eliminate code reuse attacks. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed conceptual defense that makes such a claim? And how would you tease out the threat model if none is stated with the proposed approach?
To respond with an essay, craft a thesis statement that includes a meaningful (non-binary) claim or hypothesis as your first topic sentence. Your supporting paragraphs should include 2-3 orthogonal pieces of evidence (the rule of three) to prove or argue your claim or hypothesis. The Science of Security SOK paper by Herley and van Oorschot offers several aphorisms on what makes a meaningful hypothesis:
A hypothesis is scientific only if it is consistent with some but not other possible states of affairs not yet observed, so that it is subject to the possibility of falsification by reference to experience. [Ayala]
In our view, the issue boils down to clarifying one question: what potential observational or experimental evidence is there that would persuade you that the theory is wrong and lead you to abandoning it? If there is none, it is not a scientific theory. [Ellis and Silk]
Essay 3: Machine Learning and Malware: It's Trick, Get an Axe
(Due Thursday, 3/8
for in-class peer review)
Signature-based anti-virus is no longer effective because of polymorphic viruses and the sheer quantity of new malware variants. Signatures simply lag too far behind the variants of malware. Thus, much of the field has moved toward behavior-based detection of malware. In this vein, many researchers have proposed using machine learning on various observable phenomena (e.g., power) to identify and classify malware. Often, research papers will cite the high "accuracy" as evidence of their success. You can find many such papers at security conferences. However, high accuracy is relatively trivial to achieve. The harder metrics to satisfy are precision and recall. In your essay, explain why accuracy is a red herring on the ultimate success of an ML-based malware detector, and why precision and recall are the more important metrics. To justify your claim, you may cite examples from any papers. Think about the simplest counterexamples where a detection approach with high accuracy may have poor precision or recall. You may also highlight red herring phrases from papers that report on high accuracy in their abstracts, etc.
Essay 4: Improving Trustworthiness of Sensor Output
(Due Thursday, 3/15
for in-class peer review)
The hardware spec sheet serves as contract between the chip supplier and the embedded systems engineer. An engineer can choose to ignore the requirements (e.g., minimum voltages, temperature), but then risks potential undefined behavior. A manufacturer may choose to hide certain requirements or characteristics such as resonant frequencies of MEMS sensors, the frequency response of a microphone, the cutoff frequencies of a filter, the sampling rate of the ADC, etc. What can be done to improve this contract language between the chip suppliers and chip users to better ensure the security of embedded systems against transduction attacks and make sensor outputs more verifiable despite adversarial control?
Essay 5: Reproducibility and Confidence
(Due Tuesday, 3/27
for in-class peer review)
In recent years, the field of psychology has faced what is called the reproducibility crisis. In psychology, the current standard for reproducibility is a p-value of 0.05, which has resulted in the bulk of the papers being accepted into the top journals simply being the 5% of papers that have extraordinary results due to random chance. This is also potentially a problem in the field of computer science, and security in particular, where researchers are even looser with confidence intervals. Many papers simply provide a flimsy proof of concept, because providing more rigorous evidence may be prohibitively time consuming/impossible without assistance from manufacturers. Does the field of computer security need more stringent measures of reproducibility? Argue for or against, and describe what measures should be taken, if any. Tuesday’s (March 27) assigned reading may provide direction.
Essay 6: Crypto Wars III and Assurance
(Due Thursday, 4/12
for in-class peer review)
In the 1990s, cryptographers and U.S. government debated key escrow in the context of secure phone calls and the Clipper Chip during the Clinton Administration. In Crypto Wars II during the Obama Administration, the debate shifted to the idea of a Golden Key. Susan Landau writes about the politics of wiretapping and encryption. Steve Bellovin of Columbia University argues that the latest debate in Crypto Wars III boils down to the system property of assurance. Take a position on the encryption debate (for or against technological approaches for government access to cryptographic key material). Then argue why (or why not) that non-technical measures would lead to better societal or law enforcement outcomes. The best arguments will be scoped in a manner where you can debate specifics rather than vague generalities. Your argument may be weaker or stronger depending on the class of applications you consider. (telephony? storage? hardware? software? social networks? cloud? cars? cloud cars? OK, not the last one.) Avoid unsubstantiated opinions; any claim must be backed by facts or data from reputable sources rather than FUD.
This list is subject to change.
Unfortunately, some articles require paid subscriptions to journals and digital libraries. You can access these for free when connecting on campus. For off-campus access, try the U-M VPN or the MLibrary Proxy Server Bookmarklet.
Tuesday, January 2No Class.
Thursday, January 4
- Introduction (Slides from lecture.)
- How to read a paper
Tuesday, January 9 — Threat Modeling and Security Engineering Principles
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. Kocher et al. Technical Report, January 3, 2018. Paper Review #1 Due
- Meltdown. Lipp et al. Technical Report, January 3, 2018.
- Reflections on Trusting Trust. Ken Thompson. Communications of the ACM, 27(8), Aug. 1984.
- The Security Mindset. Bruce Schneier. 2008.
- Security Engineering. Ross Anderson. Wiley, 2001.
- Handbook of Applied Cryptography. Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone. CRC Press, 1996.
Thursday, January 11 — Science and Engineering of Security
- End-to-End Arguments in System Design. Saltzer, Reed, Clark. ACM Transactions in Computer Systems 2(4), November, 1984 (an earlier version published by IEEE in 1981). Essay #1 Due [Link]
- The Protection of Information in Computer Systems. Saltzer and Schroeder. Proceedings of IEEE, 63(9), April 1975.
- SoK: Science, Security, and the Elusive Goal. Herley and van Oorschot. Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2017.
- Developing a blueprint for a science of cybersecurity. The Next Wave, The National Security Agency's Review of Emerging Technologies, 19(2), 2012. [yes, that NSA] (See "Blueprint for a Science of Cybersecurity" by Fred Schneider)
Lab Basics and Control Flow
Tuesday, January 16 — In-Class Pre-LabNo review or essay due; bring your pre-lab 1 response.
- General lab safety video, YouTube video, UBC ECE students, 2016.
- How to use an oscilloscope: digital storage oscilloscope (DSO) for beginners, YouTube video by Sheetal Chintapatla, 2016.
- Basic soldering! by iFixit, YouTube video, 2014.
- Introduction to frequency domain by Peggy Liska, online video, 2017.
- Lab safety gear, Michigan EECS, 2013.
- Lab safety: the sloppy lab, Michigan EECS, 2013.
- Lab safety: no food in lab, Michigan EECS, 2013.
- Lab safety: evacuation, Michigan EECS, 2013.
- OK Go, I Won't Let You Down, 2014.
Thursday, January 18 — Buffer Overflows
- StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks. Cowan, Pu, Maier, Hinton, Walpole, Bakke, Beattie, Grier, Wagle, and Zhang. Usenix Security 1998. Paper Review #2 Due
- Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit. Aleph One. Phrack 49(14), Nov. 1996.
- Beyond Stack Smashing: Recent Advances in Exploiting Buffer Overruns. Pincus and Baker. IEEE Security and Privacy, July–Aug. 2004.
- On the Effectiveness of ASLR. Shacham, Page, Pfaff, Goh, Modadugu, and Boneh. CCS 2004.
- English Shellcode. Mason, Small, Monrose, and MacManus. CCS 2009.
- AEG: Automatic Exploit Generation. Avgerinos, Cha, Hao, and Brumley. NDSS 2011.
Control Flow and Side Channels
Tuesday, January 23 — Sick
Thursday, January 25 — Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
- The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86) by Hovav Shacham. In ACM CCS, 2007. Essay #2 Due [Link]
- G-Free: Defeating Return-Oriented Programming through Gadget-less Binaries by Onarlioglu et al. In ACSAC, 2010.
- When Good Instructions Go Bad: Generalizing Return-Oriented Programming to RISC by Buchanan et al. In ACM CCS, 2008.
- Systematic Analysis of Defenses against Return-Oriented Programming by Skowyra et al. In RAID, 2013.
- Getting in Control of Your Control Flow with Control-Data Isolation by Arthur et al. In CGO, 2015.
Moar Side Channels
Tuesday, January 30 — Side Channels
- Differential Power Analysis by Paul Kocher. In CRYPTO 1999. Paper Review #3 Due
- Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH by Song, Wagner, Tian. In USENIX Security, 2001.
- Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical by Brumley, Boneh. In USENIX Security, 2003.
- On Subnormal Floating Point and Abnormal Timing by Andrysco, Kohlbrenner, Mowery, Jhala, Lerner, Shacham. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015.
- Secure, Precise, and Fast Floating-Point Operations on x86 Processors by Rane, Lin, Tiwari. In USENIX Security, 2016.
- On the effectiveness of mitigations against floating-point timing channels by Kohlbrenner, Shacham. In USENIX Security, 2017.
- Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds by Ristenpart, Tromer, Shacham, Savage. In ACM CCS, 2009.
- Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private Keys by Zhang, Juels, Reiter, Ristenpart. In ACM CCS, 2012.
- Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks of Flat-Panel Displays. Markus Kuhn. PETS 2004.
Thursday, February 1 — DRAM side channel
- Rowhammer by Seaborn and Dullien, Google, 2015. Paper Review #4 Due
- Flipping bits in memory without accessing them: an experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors. Kim et al. ISCA 2014.
- Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms. van der Ween et al. CCS 2016.
- ANVIL: Software-Based Protection Against Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks by Aweke, Yitbarek, Qiao, Das, Hicks, Oren, Austin. In ASPLOS, 2016.
- A2: Analog Malicious Hardware. Yang et al. Oakland 2016.
Network Security and Web Security
Tuesday, February 6 — Network Security
- Augur: Internet-Wide Detection of Connectivity Disruptions. Pearce, Ensafi, Li, Feamster, Paxson. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2017. Paper Review #5 Due
- Global Measurement of DNS Manipulation. Pearce, Jones, Li, Ensafi, Feamster, Weaver, Paxson. USENIX Security, August 2017.
Thursday, February 8 — Web Security
- Timing Attacks on Web Privacy by Felten and Schneider. In ACM CCS, 2000. Paper Review #6 Due
- DNS prefetching and its privacy implications: When good things go bad by Krishnan, Monrose. In USENIX LEET, 2010. Association (2010)
- Robust Defenses for Cross-Site Request Forgery. Barth, Jackson, and Mitchell. CSS 2008.
- Blueprint: Robust Prevention of Cross-site Scripting Attacks for Existing Browsers. Louw and Venkatakrishnan. Oakland 2009.
- Securing Browser Frame Communication. Barth, Jackson, and Mitchell. Usenix Security 2008.
- Reining in the Web with Content Security Policy. Stamm, Sterne, and Markham. WWW 2010.
Cryptography / Crap-tography
Tuesday, February 13 — How Crypto Fails in Practice
- Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices. Heninger, Durumeric, Wustrow, and Halderman. Usenix Security 2012. Paper Review #7 Due
- Why Cryptosystems Fail. Ross Anderson. Commun. ACM, 37(11), Nov. 1994.
- Why Information Security is Hard: An Economic Perspective. Ross Anderson. ACSAC 2001.
- Randomness and the Netscape Browser by Goldberg, Wagner. In Dr. Dobb's Journal, January 1996.
Thursday, February 15 — How Crypto Protocols Fail in Practice, and Pre-Proposal Presentations
- Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2 by Vanhoef, Piessens. In ACM CCS, October 2017. [KRACK website] No written response required for today. Instead, group project proposals are due (1-pager on Heilmeier Catechism, short presentations)
Internet of Things
Tuesday, February 20 — No class, work on lab No review or essay due; spend time on Lab 2 power analysis which is due tomorrow (Wednesday, February 21)
Thursday, February 22 — Automobile Security
- Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces. Checkoway, McCoy, Kantor, Anderson, Shacham, Savage, Koscher, Czeskis, Roesner, and Kohno. Usenix Security 2011. Paper Review #8 Due
- Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile. Koscher, Czeskis, Roesner, Patel, Kohno, Checkoway, McCoy, Kantor, Anderson, Shacham, and Savage. Oakland 2010.
- Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units. Miller and Valasek. Countermeasure 2013.
- Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle. Miller and Valasek. DEF CON 23, Aug. 2015.
- Illuminating the Security Issues Surrounding Lights-Out Server Management. Bonkoski, Bielawski, and Halderman. WOOT 2013.
Moar Internet of Things and Side Channels
Tuesday, March 6 — Medical Device Security
- Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses by Halperin et al. In IEEE Security and Privacy (Oakland), May 2008. Paper Review #9 Due
- Implantable Cardiac Pacemakers by Abbott (formerly St. Jude Medical): Safety Communication - Firmware Update to Address Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, FDA Safety Alert, August 29, 2017.
- Cybersecurity concerns and medical devices: Lessons from a pacemaker advisory by Kramer, Fu. In Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), October 2017.
- Cybersecurity and medical devices: A practical guide for cardiac electrophysiologists by Ransford et al. In Pacing and Clinical Electrophysiology (PACE), 40(8), July 2017.
- Commentary: Hospitals need better cybersecurity, not more fear by Fu, Halamka, Kufahl, Logan. In Modern Healthcare, September 2016.
- Pacemaker Recall Exposes National Need for Research and Education in Embedded Security by Fu. In CCC Blog, October 2017.
- Holes found in report on St. Jude medical device security by Nicole Cassal Moore, Michigan Engineering, August 30, 2016.
Thursday, March 8 — Power Side Channels
- WattsUpDoc: Power Side Channels to Nonintrusively Discover Untargeted Malware on Embedded Medical Devices by Clark et al. In USENIX HealthTech, August 2013. Essay #3 Due [Link]
- Hidden Technical Debt in Machine Learning Systems by Sculley et al. In NIPS, 2005.
- Detecting energy-greedy anomalies and mobile malware variants by Kim, Smith, Shin. In ACM MobiSys, June 2008.
- Televisions, video privacy, and powerline electromagnetic interference by Enev, Gupta, Kohno, Patel. In ACM CCS, October 2011.
- Potentia est Scientia: Security and Privacy Implications of Energy-Proportional Computing by Clark, Ransford, Fu. In USENIX HotSec, August 2012.
- Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet by Clark et al. In ESORICS, September 2013.
Tuesday, March 13 — Sensor Integrity: Ultrasonic Attacks
- DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands by Zhang et al. In ACM CCS, 2017. [videos] Paper Review #10 Due
- Inside Risks: Risks of Trusting the Physics of Sensors by Fu, Xu. In Communications of the ACM 61(2), February 2018.
- Backdoor: Making Microphones Hear Inaudible Sounds by Roy et al. In ACM MobiSys, 2017. [video]
- Inaudible Voice Commands by Song and Mittal, Tech Report, 2017.
- Inaudible Voice Commands: The Real-World Attack and Defense by Roy et al. To Appear in USENIX NSDI, April 2018.
- Continuous Authentication for Voice Assistants by Feng et al. In ACM MobiCom, 2017.
Thursday, March 15 — Sensor Integrity: MEMS Acoustic Attacks
- WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks by Trippel et al. In IEEE Euro Security and Privacy, 2017. [website] Essay #4 Due [link]
- Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech from Gyroscope Signals by Michalevsky et al. In USENIX Security, 2014. [website]
- Rocking Drones with Intentional Sound Noise on Gyroscopic Sensors by Son et al. In USENIX Security, 2015.
Risks of Feedback Control
Tuesday, March 20 — Fault Injection: Electromechanical Devices
- Blue Note: How Intentional Acoustic Interference Damages Availability and Integrity in Hard Disk Drives and Operating Systems by Bolton et al. To appear in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), May 2018. Paper Review #11 Due
- Ghost Talk: Mitigating EMI Signal Injection Attacks against Analog Sensors by Foo Kune et al. In Oakland 2013.
- Illusion and Dazzel: Adversarial Optical Channel Exploits Against Lidars for Automotive Applications by Shin et al. In CHES 2017.
- Non-invasive Spoofing Attacks for Anti-lock Braking Systems by Shoukry et al. In CHES 2013.
- This ain't your dose: Sensor Spoofing Attack on Medical Infusion Pump by Youngseok et at. In WOOT 2016.
- Rocking Drones with Intentional Sound Noise on Gyroscopic Sensors by Son et al. In USENIX Security, 2015.
Thursday, March 22 — Crypto Side Channels
- RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis by Genkin, Shamir, Tromer. In CRYPTO 2014 Paper Review #12 Due
- Acoustic Cryptanalysis by Genkin, Shamir, Tromer. In Journal of Cryptology, 30(2), April 2017. (will probably need a U-M IP to download, otherwise try the website for related work)
- Get Your Hands Off My Laptop: Physical Side-Channel Key-Extraction Attacks on PCs, Genkin et al. In Ches 2014.
- Sliding Right into Disaster: Left-to-Right Sliding Windows Leak, Daniel J. Bernstein et al. In Ches, 2017.
- May the Fourth Be With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack on Several Real-World Applications of Curve25519, Genkin et al. In CCS, 2017.
- Language Identification of Encrypted VoIP Traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?, Wright et al. In USENIX Security, 2007.
Usable Security (USENIX SOUPS!)
Tuesday, March 27 — Usable Encryption
- Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0. Whitten and Tygar. Usenix Security 1999. Essay #5 Due [link]
- The Science of Guessing: Analyzing an Anonymized Corpus of 70 Million Passwords. Joseph Bonneau. Oakland 2012.
- Alice in Warningland: A Large-Scale Field Study of Browser Security Warning Effectiveness. Akhawe and Felt. Usenix Security 2013.
Thursday, March 29 — Usable Security: Permissions
- Securing Embedded User Interfaces: Android and Beyond. Roesner and Kohno. Usenix Security 2013. Paper Review #13 Due
- User-Driven Access Control: Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern Operating Systems. Roesner, Kohno, Moshchuk, Parno, Wang, and Cowan. Oakland 2012.
- Android Permissions Demystified. Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song, and Wagner. CCS 2011.
- Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior. Felt, Ha, Egelman, Haney, Chin, and Wagner. SOUPS 2012.
Tuesday, April 3 — Project Feedback Bring a first draft of your group project writeup. No reviews due today
Thursday, April 5 — Censorship
- Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Dingledine, Mattewson, and Syverson. Usenix Security 2004. Paper Review #14 Due
- SoK: Secure Messaging. Unger, Dechand, Bonneau, Fahl, Perl, Goldberg, and Smith. Oakland 2015.
- Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries. Johnson, Wacek, Jansen, Sherr, and Syverson. CCS 2013.
- Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not to Use PGP. Borisov, Goldberg, and Brewer. WPES 2004.
- Examining How the Great Firewall Discovers Hidden Circumvention Servers. Ensafi, Fifield, Winter, Feamster, Weaver, and Paxson. IMC 2015.
- Internet Censorship in Iran: A First Look. Aryan, Aryan, and Halderman. FOCI 2013.
Tuesday, April 10 — Surveillance: Fingerprinting and Forensics
- Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting. Kohno, Broido, and Claffy. Oakland 2005. Paper Review #15 Due
- Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by their Clock Skew by Murdoch. In ACM CCS, 2006.
- Power-up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers by Holcomb, Burleson, Fu. In IEEE Trans. on Computers, 57(11), November 2008.
- Reliably Erasing Data From Flash-Based Solid State Drives by Wei, Grupp, Spada, Swanson. In USENIX FAST, 2011.
- Secure Data Deletion. Reardon, Basin, and Capkun. Oakland 2013.
- Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys. Halderman, Schoen, Heninger, Clarkson, Paul, Calandrino, Feldman, Appelbaum, and Felten. Usenix Security 2008.
- History Independence for File Systems. Bajat and Sion. CCS 2013.
- BootJacker: Compromising Computers Using Forced Restarts. Chan, Carlyle, David, Farivar, and Campbell. CCS 2008.
- Shredding Your Garbage: Reducing Data Lifetime Through Secure Deallocation. Chow, Pfaff, Garfinkel, and Rosenblum. Usenix Security 2005.
Thursday, April 12 — Cybercrime and Cyberwar
- Keys Under Doormats. Abelson, Anderson, Bellovin, Benaloh, Blaze, Diffie, Gilmore, Green, Landau, Neumann, Rivest, Schiller, Schneier, Specter, and Weitzner. July 2015. Essay #6 Due [Link]
- PharmaLeaks: Understanding the Business of Online Pharmaceutical Affiliate Programs. McCoy et al. USENIX Security 2012.
- Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. Stone-Gross, Cova, Cavallaro, Gilbert, Szydlowski, Kemmerer, Kruegel, and Vigna. CCS 2009.
- Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion. Kanich, Kreibich, Levchenko, Enright, Voelker, Paxson, and Savage. CCS 2008.
- Clickjacking: Attacks and Defenses. Huang, Moshchuk, Wang, Schechter, and Jackson. Usenix Security 2012.
- An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs. Finifter, Akhawe, and Wagner. Usenix Security 2013.
- W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Falliere, Murchu, and Chien. Symantec technical report, 2011.
- The Morris Worm: A Fifteen-Year Perspective. Orman. IEEE Security and Privacy, Sept./Oct. 2003.
- APT1 Report. Mandiant technical report, 2013.
- Cyberwar and Peace. Thomas Rid. Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2013.
- To Kill a Centrifuge. Ralph Langner. Nov. 2013.
- Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search. Feb. 2016.
- Apple Inc.'s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government's Motion to Compel Assistance. Feb. 2016.
- Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. James Comey. July 2015.
- Going Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening Communications Infrastructure. Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, and Landau. IEEE Security & Privacy 11:1, Jan/Feb 2013.
- The Export of Cryptography in the 20th Century and the 21st. Diffie and Landau. In the Handbook of the History of Information Security, Elsevier, 2005.
- Bernstein v. United States. 1995–2002.
- Lavabit Legal Proceedings. 2013.
Tuesday, April 17 — In-Class Presentations
- Term papers are due before sunset